The Structural Problem of Epistemic Justification is not a Regress Problem
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20873.rpv9n2-18Keywords:
Epistemic justification, Regress, Problem, SkepticismAbstract
The Trilema of Agripa is most commonly seen in its contemporary discussion as the Regress Problem. However, I argue that this perspective is in need of revision given certain recent developments in the debate concerning the problem in the analytic tradition. I began with an intuitive description of the problem, followed by the traditional reconstruction of the Trilem as the Regress Problem. The passage from an intuitive view of the problem to a theoretical one is delicate. And the details involved in this passage should not be ignored, as they illustrate how the prevailed perspective of the problem in the debate issues from important assumptions. However, recent authors decided to return to the Pyrrhonian skepticism behind the problem and managed to defend that the regress is not the problem actually. I argue that this strategy became a point of no return for the debate where we no longer should consider the Trilema as establishing the regress as a problem. I end with a suggestion concerning which way the debate should go if we are to address its skepticism properly.
References
AIKIN, S. F. Epistemology and the Regress Problem. New York: Routledge, 2010.
ALSTON, W. Epistemic Desiderata. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Rhode Island, v. LXIII, n. 3, 1993, p. 527-551.
AUDI, R. The Structure of Justification. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
BONJOUR, L. Externalist Theories of Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, v. 5, 1980, p. 53-73.
BONJOUR, L. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.
BONJOUR, L.; SOSA, Ernest. Epistemic Justification: internalism vs externalism, foundations vs virtues. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2003.
COHEN. Is There an Issue About Justified Belief? Philosophical Topics. Arkansas, v. 23, n. 1: 1995.
FUMERTON. Richard. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. London: Rowman e Littlefield Publishers, 1995.
KLEIN, P. Certainty: a refutation of scpeticism. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1981.
KLEIN, P. Real Knowledge. Synthese. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 55, 1983, p. 143-164.
KLEIN, P. Human Knowledge and The Infinite Regress of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Ed. J. Tomberlin, v. 13, Epistemology, 1999, 297-325.
KLEIN, P. Coherence, Knowledge and Skeptcism. In: OLSSON, Erik J. (Ed.). The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003a, p. 281-298.
KLEIN, P. When Infinite Regresses Are Not Vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Rhode Island, v. LXVI, n. 3, 2003b, p. 718-729.
KLEIN, P. What “IS” Wrong with Foundationalism is That it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Rhode Island, v. LXVIII, n. 1, 2004a, p. 166-171.
KLEIN, P. Skeptcism: Ascent and Assent? In: GRECO, John. Ernest Sosa: and his critics. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, 2004b. p. 112-125.
KLEIN, P. Infinitism's Take On Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism. Veritas. v. 50. n. 4, 2005a, p. 153-172.
KLEIN, P. Reply to Ginet. In: SOSA, Ernest; STEUP, Matthias (ed.). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, 2005b, p. 149-152.
KLEIN, P. Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasons. Philosophical Studies. New York, v. 134, 2007a, p. 1-17.
KLEIN, P. How to be an infinitist about doxastic justification. Philosophical Studies. New York, v. 134, 2007b, p. 25-29.
KLEIN, P. How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skeptcism. In: SOSA, Ernest; KIM, Jaegwow; FANTL, Jeremy; MCGRATH, Mathew (ed.). Epistemology An Anthology. 2.ed. Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2008, p. 35-50.
KLEIN, P. Infinitism. In. BERNECKER, Sven; PRITCHARD, Duncan. The Routledge Companion to Epistemo-logy. London: Routledge, 2011a, p. 245-256.
KLEIN, P. Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism. In: MACHUCA, Diego E. (ed.) Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Nova York: Springer, 2011b, p. 79-96.
MCLAUGHIN, B.; BENNET, K. Supervenience. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2023), EDWARD, N. Zalta (ed.). Disponível em: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/> Acesso em: 15/07/2024 PRYOR, James. The Skeptic and the Dogmatic. Noûs, 34 (4), 2000.
MCLAUGHIN, B.; BENNET, K. Problems for Credulism. In: TUCKER, Chris. Seemings and Justification: new essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 328-349.
MCLAUGHIN, B.; BENNET, K. There is Immediate Justification. In: STEUP, M.; TURRI, J.; SOSA, E. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden: Wyley Blackwell, 2014, p. 202-222.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Allysson Vasconcelos Lima Rocha
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
The Magazine is under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC BY 4.0), according to which:
1) The authors retain the copyright and grant the journal the right of first publication, with the work simultaneously licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution which allows the sharing of articles published with the recognition of authorship and initial publication in this journal.
2) Authors are authorized to enter into additional contracts separately for distribution of the version of the work published in this journal, as long as there is recognition of authorship and initial publication in Perspectivas.
3) Authors are authorized and encouraged to disseminate published texts with proper references to the journal and its authors.
