The pragmatics of meaning

Revisiting Wittgenstein’s use theory of language

Résumé

This article examines Wittgenstein’s critique of Saint Augustine’s referential theory of language in Philosophical Investigations, analyzing its limitations and exploring Wittgenstein’s alternative framework centered on use, language-games, and forms of life. Augustine’s model – where words name objects, meaning is reference, and learning occurs via ostension – serves as Wittgenstein’s primary target to dismantle essentialist and representational theories of language. The research has two key objectives: 1) to demonstrate how Wittgenstein’s rejection of Augustine’s “naming-describing” dichotomy reveals the diversity of linguistic functions (e.g., psychological statements like “I have toothache”); and 2) to argue that Wittgenstein’s shift from meaning as reference in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to meaning as use in the Philosophical Investigations resolves philosophical problems surrounding private experience, solipsism, and public language. The methodology combines conceptual analysis of Wittgenstein’s texts with critical engagement with secondary literature to trace the evolution of his thought. Key findings include: a) ostensive definitions fail for immaterial concepts (e.g., pain); b) the “beetle in the box” analogy critiques Cartesian privacy, showing sensations gain meaning through public language-games; and c) grammar, not ontology, governs word-use, as seen in contrasts like “I have toothache” (expression) versus “He has a book” (description). The article concludes that Wittgenstein’s later work replaces Augustine’s “physical language” model with a pluralistic view of language as a toolkit embedded in social practices, challenging nominalism and reshaping debates on intentionality and linguistic diversity.