Sobre a certeza sensível e o problema do começo da filosofia

um diálogo entre Hegel e Feuerbach

Abstract

This article aims to analyze sensitive certain concepts in Hegel and Feuerbach, based on the exposure of the first chapter of the Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes [1807]) and feuerbachian For the critique of Hegel’s philosophy (Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie [1839]). At first moment the exposure is driven by Hegelian perspective, which takes the view that while the sensitive conscience pretends to reach the truth of the object as something natural and free of mediations and that, therefore, believed to have possession knowledge truer and rich, goes through contradictions that cannot be solved without making the leap to the level of perception; what seemed natural it looks now universal, and the “know” supposedly rich will prove the poorest and abstract empty. In the second phase, reading the above work of Feuerbach, we have to be sensitive sure, as considered by the Phenomenology, is just a play on words of thought to himself; the argument now is that Hegel part of a concept of distinct sensitivity of the actual reality and that, therefore, the refutation Hegelian only occurs logically, but not really about the truth of sensitive certain.