Some reflections on the semantic approach, tarskian truth and structuralism

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.20873/rpv8n1-69

Resumo

In the present paper, we return to one of the main theses we already defended concerning the role of the tarskian truth notion within the semantic approach (CARNIER, 2022). As it was argued, this truth notion proves to be insufficient to be applied to scientific theories as they are conceived by this approach, i.e., as extralinguistic entities, because it is a property of sentences and because the tarskian truth of a sentence doesn't necessarily mean the world is as it describes, which results in the fact that other truth conceptions more appropriate need to be articulated within the several members of the semanticist family, in order to characterize the relationship between theory and phenomenon. Our argument in this regard was based in a case study applied to constructive empiricism and quasi-realism, but in this paper we extend our analysis to structuralism, assuming and endorsing the position according to which this proposal may be considered a member of the semantic approach.

 

Referências

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PERSPECTIVAS | VOL. 8, Nº 1, 2023, P. 296-311

Some reflections on the semantic approach, Tarskian truth and structuralism

DOI: 10.20873/rpv8n1-69

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Publicado

2023-04-05

Como Citar

Cunha Carnier, R. (2023). Some reflections on the semantic approach, tarskian truth and structuralism. Perspectivas, 8(1), 296–311. https://doi.org/10.20873/rpv8n1-69

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Dossiê Filosofia da Física