

OLD(?) TV AND FREE ELECTORAL PROPAGANDA Impacts on the 2024 municipal elections

A VELHA(?) TV E A PROPAGANDA GRATUITA: impactos sobre as eleições municipais de 2024

LA VIEJA(?) TV Y LA PUBLICIDAD GRATUITA: impactos en las elecciones municipales de 2024

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ABSTRACT

This article seeks to answer how free electoral propaganda on TV had influence on the result of municipal elections in Brazil, having as a cut the statistics of the election in 26 capitals. We used a descriptive method, characterizing the research as a case study (Yin, 2005). As a reference, we use the times of free propaganda in the first round, insofar as, in the second round, the times are distributed equally between the two candidates. The theoretical framework is based on the concept of the Digital Prince (Bittencourt, 2016) and platformization (Poell; Nieberg; Van Dijck, 2020), with the main support of the reach of media in Brazil, particularly television, and also the studies of Silveira (1994, 1988) regarding the vote in Brazil and Aldé (2011) on the types of internet users. In the summary of results, in 17 capitals the winners had, in the first round, more or equal TV time than their opponents.

KEYWORDS: Electoral propaganda; Municipal elections; Television; Internet; Platformization.

Introduction

Who would be the protagonist of free propaganda in the election of mayors in Brazil, in 2024? The internet, considered the digital prince by Bittencourt (2016), radio or television? The impact of social media in the last two presidential elections (Baptista, 2019) sparked discussions about the influence of media (or digital platforms) on voter decision-making. In 2018, for example, despite holding more than half the total time of daily free electoral propaganda, with 5 min 23 sec, Geraldo Alckmin, from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), was fourth in the first round, with 4.76% of valid votes. Jair Bolsonaro, from the Social Liberal Party (PSL), with 8 seconds of propaganda on radio and TV, but with a strong presence in social media, advanced to the second round and won the election competing with Fernando Haddad, from the Workers' Party (PT), the second longest time among the candidates.

These data lead us to rethink the role of television time in the electoral campaign, since, in the past, we had candidates elected by TV influence and, in contemporaneity, it is already possible to question the hegemony of television, given the availability of platforms. In this way, the article seeks to answer how free propaganda had an influence on the result of the elections for mayor in 2024, having as its cut statistics of the 26 capitals. The methodology includes bibliographic research, in the search for references and interlocations with the empirical objects of the research. For the analytical and interpretive construction, analysis and observation of available documents was made and comparison and quantification of data from the selected results. It is characterized, in this way, as a descriptive multiple case study. "Traces the sequence of interpersonal

events over time, describes a subculture that has rarely been the subject of previous studies and discovers its key phenomena" (Yin, 2001, p. 22).

The data prove a scenario of changing consumption of mass media, which no longer reflect traditional access to information by a single reference, but rather an entanglement of sources of content production and, consequently, electoral propaganda repository, which has spread through digital social networks organically and coordinated by communication and marketing agents. We consider the research relevant for monitoring the transformations and impact of electoral propaganda, and for analyzing the large volume of information obtained in official bodies regarding the respective times of candidates' propaganda on radio and TV.

In this text, after this introduction, we present a general overview of the lawsuit, including legislation, vehicle scope and audience data. Next, we present a theoretical discussion on the subject and electoral results, focusing on the relationship between propaganda time and success (effective, in this case, culminating with the election) at the polls.

Initial reflections

In times of reconfiguration of media consumption habits, in which the scientific environment discusses even the end of TV (Carlón and Fachine, 2014), what is the influence of radio and television on the national political environment? And how does the internet user voter behave?

Audience data in the election period reinforce the prestige of the TV vehicle, which was verified at the premiere of the advertisement, on August 30, having as reference the numbers of Ibope of the main broadcaster, Rede Globo.

[...] the electoral propaganda from 1:00 p.m. to 1:10 p.m. on Globo had more audience (10.5 points) than 'Globo Esporte' (10.0), 'Jornal Hoje' (9.8) and the film 'Sessão da Tarde' (10.4). That same Friday night, the election program from 8:30 to 8:40 PM generated a higher rating (19.7 points) than the audiences of the novel 'No Rancho Fundo' (19.2) and the musical reality show 'Estrela da Casa' (13.3). Last Monday (9/9), the lunchtime advertisement scored 9.7 average points, above the performance of 'Mais Você' (7.1) and 'Encontro' (7.1), and tied with the local news of the city of São Paulo, 'SPTV'. In the prime band, the candidates' promise block nearly tied for 'Família é Tudo' (both in the 21-point range) and was less

than 2 points behind the debut of 'Mania de Você'. Won from the 6 p.m. telenovela and local news (Benicio, 2024).

According to the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE), in 2024, free election propaganda was broadcast on radio and television (open TV only) from August 30¹, in the first round, and from October 11 to 25, in cities where there was a second round.

Free election propaganda is mandatory for radio and television stations, which must broadcast the programming of political parties and party coalitions from Monday to Saturday. On radios, the transmission must be made from 7 a.m. to 7:10 a.m. and from 12 p.m. to 12:10 p.m., and on TV, from 1:00 p.m. to 1:10 p.m. and from 8:30 p.m. to 8:40 p.m. Throughout the daily schedule, it is also mandatory for broadcasters to reserve 70 minutes per day for 30- and 60-second insertions, from Monday to Sunday, between 5 a.m. and midnight (TSE, 2024a).

Propaganda on radio and open TV (public concession vehicles) ensures the voter's democratic access to candidates' and parties' proposals. But it is not free. Broadcasters are entitled to tax compensation for the assignment of 10 evening minutes and 10 minutes in the night band. Law 14.291, of 1995, indicates that the average billing of the commercial interval will be the basis of calculation to define how much the channel may deduct from taxes due to the Union. But in what way does this free propaganda get widespread?

According to Kantar Ibope (2023), radio reaches 80% of the population of 13 capitals surveyed, with an average consumption of 3 hours and 55 minutes per day. The highest rates (84%) were recorded in Greater Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, while the lowest rates (77%) occurred in Recife and São Paulo. Also according to the survey, the listener consumes radio, in order, at home (54%), in a private car or motorcycle (27%), in face-to-face work (12%) and at home office work (7%), in public transport (5%), on the street, while commuting (4%), in an app car or motorcycle (4%) and other contexts (4%).

In 2023, according to PNAD (2024), the country had 78.3 million households. Of these, there were TV sets in 73.9 million (94.3%), an index 0.6% lower than the 2022 survey. In 2016, there was television in 97.2% of households. Since electoral propaganda is broadcast only on open TV, the numbers about this data are interesting: in the urban

¹ On the internet, propaganda began on August 16, under the responsibility of the candidates themselves, with rules established by TSE Resolution no 23.610/2019 (TSE, 2024b).

area, 69.6 million Brazilians (88.9%) have access to this type of signal. One in four households (25.2%) has access to pay TV, which, in the case of a duplicate signal at home, gives an option of programming to the viewer on free election time, subject of the survey.

The numbers about the internet point to multiple environments and dynamic consumption habits. With the modernization of mobile phones, technology works at the service of the user, previously restricted to access via home computer, present in 45.9% of households, in 2016. In 2023, this rate rose to 39%, while the number of mobile phone households rose from 86.2% (2016) to 95.3%. In the general average (PNAD, 2024), 87.6% of the Brazilian population over 10 years (163.8 million) had a mobile phone, which means 256 million devices, at least 40 million more than the population (211.1 million). Within this universe, 96.7% of mobile users had internet access. These numbers leave network access (94.1% average, in the urban area) in percentage equated to TV presence (94.3%).

Intuitive voting and the internet: a necessary discussion

The internet today, according to Bittencourt (2016), includes the proposal to build the concept of the Digital Prince as a variant of the category created by Ianni (1999) for the Electronic Prince, based on the concept of Nicolau Machiavelli's Prince, in the 16th century, in the age of digital networks. According to the author, are structured the categories: power, hegemony and leadership, pillars of all theoretical models of princes existing until then. In this way, one can reflect on some of the phenomena of contemporaneity, such as the impacts of free propaganda on radio and television on the 2024 municipal elections.

Historically (early 20th century), the concept of Prince was used by Machiavelli to describe the ruler of monarchies and republics. Then, from the middle of the 20th century, Gramsci (1980, 2004, 2011, 2014a, 2014b) associated the Prince with the political party, as the Modern Prince. At the end of the 20th century, Ianni (1999) presents the Electronic Prince, having radio and especially television as places of power, hegemony and leadership. When analyzing the 2024 electoral process in Brazil, one can identify a new power of digital social networks, supported via the internet as an element of transformation of media consumption habits, altering the audience of traditional media, such as radio and television.

The differential of new communication possibilities is their power to spread through various platforms. This includes platformization as another element of transformation of the processes and social practices of communication in contemporary

society. According to Poell, Nieberg and Van Dijck (2020, p. 2) platformization can be defined "as the penetration of infrastructures, economic processes and government structures of digital platforms in different economic sectors and spheres of life". This digital tangle in which the internet initially opened democratic spaces for everyone, now it is realized that it may be an apparent democracy, taking into account the possibility of the Digital Prince, a phenomenon in which platforms end up controlling the flow of information, from economic interests and hegemonic control of spaces, with the aid of algorithms.

Politics is a frequent user of these spaces. But what does this mean in terms of converting messages into votes? And how do Brazilians vote? Silveira (1994) generally points out, in a) parties; b) rationally (as a consumer); c) by material interest; d) in ideas or e) by intuition.

Party voting (also explained by social context) is a feature of elections in the United States and in part of Europe, between 1940 and 1960; in Brazil, in the 1970s (Silveira, 1994). In recent years, what the author calls rational voting has come to be seen as a product, exercised by an elector "well-informed" about political matters and with defined views on these matters, who decides his vote from a complex set of factors" (Silveira, 1994, p. 97).

But Brazil still keeps remnants of the control times of the voter vote, characteristic of coronelism and called "voto de cabresto" (clientelist voting). According to the author, between 1940 and 1960, in the country predominates the vote merchandise, for interest material, or clientelist, characteristic of a voter uninformed and connected by particular interests to local political bosses.

The ideological vote, the most predictable, characteristic of the 1960s, comes from a well-informed voter about their choices, based on their own ideal in relation to politics. But there are new things in this scenario.

"There is in Brazil a considerable group of low-income voters, poorly informed politically and poorly educated who are neither clientelists nor follow consistent and predictable behavior patterns" (Silveira, 1994, p. 98). They practice what the author calls intuitive voting, which arises from ignorance about the political scene, but also from the desire to participate in the electoral game.

The voter not bound to leadership and parties, acts autonomously, establishing punctual and fleeting identifications mainly with candidates, in view of their symbolic attributes. Captures in the media the images it needs to, through a

judgment of taste, choose the candidates considered authentic holders of the valued symbolic characteristics (Silveira, 1998, p. 247).

Who would this intuitive voter be in the digital realm? The question arises in response to Aldé's (2011) reflection on the types of Internet user: avid, assiduous, a consumer of scandals, frustrated and uninformed, still considering the existence of citizens totally disconnected from this virtual world, the excluded. The avid are internet users who "search and compare content, using the instruments of the network to investigate and diversify reference frames" (Aldé, 2011, p. 374). Already the assiduous seek political information in a casual way, using several sources, prioritizing platforms that they judge more reliable. However, the internet is terrain that reaches all types of users, including consumers of scandals or trenders, "a name related to fashion, to the strong influence on these users, majority trends and opinion climate" (Aldé, 2011, p. 379). Frustrated, the author continues, would be those potential voters who seek on the internet an information that they have given up finding in traditional media or big media. Users are more likely to change category, according to the result of this performance in the network. Finally, there are the uninformed, those who clearly show no interest in politics. These users are interested only in other possibilities of the network: games, banking transactions, among others.

Long before the digital environment, media already added the "power to hijack political issues into the sphere of visibility or start discussions of political issues", according to Gomes (2008, p. 160). In 2024, judging by the statistics of the capitals, the result showed the strength of traditional vehicles. No candidate without time in radio and TV won the election, which also recorded points that demand reflection on politics and internet.

For example, in Curitiba, Cristina Graeml of the Brazilian Municipalist Party (PMB), with no time on TV, reached the second round against Eduardo Pimentel of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), then deputy mayor of the capital of Paraná and elected mayor in 2024, who had the longest propaganda time (table 1).

Table 1

Data and result of the election for mayor of Curitiba (PR)

Candidate	Party	Propaganda		1st round		2nd round	
		Time	%	Votes Position	Votes Position		
Eduardo Pimentel	PSD	4:42	58,41	33,51% 1º	57,64% 1º		
Luciano Ducci	PSB	2:12	25,53	19,44% 3º	-		
Ney Leprevost	União Brasil	1:14	14,31	6,49% 4º	-		
Maria Victoria	PP	1:07	12,95	2,19% 6º	-		
Andrea Caldas	PSOL	0:25	4,83	0,86% 8º	-		
Luizão Goulart	Solidariedade	0:17	3,28	4,41% 5º	-		
Cristina Graeml	PMB	-	-	31,17% 2º	42,36% 2º		
Roberto Requião	Mobiliza	-	-	1,83% 7º	-		
Samuel de Mattos	PSTU	-	-	0,06% 9º	-		
Felipe Bombardelli	PCO	-	-	0,04% 10º	-		

Source: Prepared by the authors (2024).

Social networks suspended, verbal (and physical) aggression and few debates marked the election in São Paulo. Pablo Marçal, of PRTB, did not have TV time because the party was affected by the barrier clause. However, by 56,853 votes he did not compete in the second round against then mayor Ricardo Nunes (PMDB). In the first round, the election had very close numbers among the top three. However, in the end he won the candidate who had control of the public machine and more than twice the sum of the propaganda times of the other candidates (table 2).

Table 2

Data and result of the election for mayor of São Paulo (SP)

Candidate (Party)	Propaganda		Instagram Followers	Placement 1st round (%)	Placement 2nd round (%)
	Time	%			
Ricardo Nunes (PMDB)	6:30	65,32	1,04 million	1º 29,48	1º 59,35
Guilherme Boulos (PSOL)	2:22	23,78	2,47 millions	2º 29,07	2º 40,65
Datena (PSDB)	0:35	5,86	1,08 million	5º 1,84	
Tabata Amaral (PSB)	0:30	5,02	1,77 million	4º 9,91	
Pablo Marçal (PRTB)	-	-	12,77 millions²	3º 28,14	
Marina Helena (Novo)	-	-	416 thousand	6º 1,38	
Ricardo Senese (UP)	-	-	7,4 thousand	7º 0,09	

² Data of 25 November 2024. Pablo Marçal has two profiles. The main one, created in 2016 (@pablomarcal1), was even suspended by the Electoral Justice because the candidate showed false report on alleged use of cocaine by the candidate Guilherme Boulos. In another profile, created in August 2024 (pablomarcalporsp) has 5.4 million followers.

Altino Prazeres (PSTU)	-	-	8,3 thousand	8º	
				0,05	
João Pimenta (PCO)	-	-	387 ³	9º	
				0,02	
Bebeto Haddad ⁴ (DC)	-	-	442	10º	
				0,01	

Source: Prepared by the authors (2024).

As in Curitiba, the election of São Paulo shows a differentiated strategy of candidates with no time for free propaganda on radio and television. Pablo Marçal, who played the campaign in the streets and social networks. Incorporating the figure of the outsider wronged by the system, due to the absence of propaganda in traditional media, he sought to guide the media through radical attitudes, both in debates and in media coverage of his statements and those of other candidates.

In the Northeast, the re-election of then-mayor João Campos (PSB) in Recife, still in the first round – 10 other capitals decided the election without need of second round – shows the efficiency of the combination time of TV and radio and action on social networks, according to table 3.

Table 3

Data and results in the first round of candidates for mayor of Recife (PE)

Candidate	Party	Propaganda		Instagram Followers ⁵	Votes 1st round	Placement
		Time	%			
João Campos	PSB	4:45	47,57	2,7 millions	78,11%	1º
Daniel Coelho	PSD	2:39	26,54	71,9 thousand	3,21%	4º
Gilson Machado	PL	2:05	20,86	492 thousand	13,90%	2º
Dani Portela	PSOL	0:30	5,01	56 thousand	3,78%	3º
Tecio Teles	Novo	-	-	8,7 thousand	0,79%	5º
Ludmila	UP	-	-	4,5 thousand	0,15%	6º
Simone Santana	PSTU	-	-	25,2 thousand	0,06%	7º

Source: Prepared by the authors (2024).

João Campos had about half of the total advertising time on radio and TV, as well as a significant presence on the internet⁶. But despite the increase in internet consumption in the country, in 15 of the 26 capitals the candidate winner of the election had the largest radio and television time. In two, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte,

³ João Pimenta had a candidacy was disclosed through the profile of the PCO of São Paulo.

⁴ Bebeto Haddad did not have his application approved by the TSE.

⁵ Data updated as of 25 November 2024.

⁶ João Campos is the most popular mayor on social media, with 2.92 million followers. Next comes Eduardo Paes (PSD), from Rio de Janeiro, with 1.48 million. Data collected on July 13, 2024 (Tinim and Pinheiro, 2024).

despite the lower time of the winner, the difference in space in propaganda between the main competitors was considered negligible: exactly 9 seconds, which makes it reasonable to raise this number to 17. Thus, in nine capitals the winners had significantly less propaganda time than the opponents, with the exception of Boa Vista, whose difference between times was one second.

In the calculation by region, the South is the only one where the three victorious candidates had the most TV time. In the Southeast, similar situation, in that the times of victors compared to the main opponents, in Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro, were smaller, but with little significant difference. In the Midwest, in only one capital, Goiânia, the victorious candidate had more time in electoral propaganda. In the Northeast, the winning candidate had more radio and TV time in six of the nine capitals. In the North, of the seven capitals, three gave victory to candidates with more free propaganda time.

Of the 20 mayors who competed for a new term, 16 were successful, 10 in the first round and six in the second. Overall among the re-elected, 10 had more free propaganda time on radio and TV and six won the election even with less time than the main opponent. The general rule of the winner with the longest time on radio and TV was maintained only in the first round.

Among the 10 elected in the first stage of the election, seven occupied the largest amount of time in free propaganda and three had less time than the opponents. In the second round, this proportion was exactly the same: three with a shorter time and three with a longer time on election time. The reelection of mayors occurred in all the states of the Southeast region; in five of the nine capitals of the Northeast; in one of the three of the Midwest, in two of the three capitals of the South and in four of the seven of the North region (table 4).

Table 4

Demonstration of the electoral result in 26 capitals

	Capital	Winner	Longer radio and TV time	Situation
Southeast	Belo Horizonte	Fuad Noman (PSD)	No	Reelected 2nd round
	Rio de Janeiro	Eduardo Paes (PSD)	No	Reelected 1st round
	Vitória	Lorenzo Pazolini (Republicanos)	Yes	Reelected 1st round
	São Paulo	Ricardo Nunes (MDB)	Yes	Reelected 2nd round
North	Manaus	David Almeida (Avante)	No	Reelected 2nd round

	Capital	Winner	Longer radio and TV time	Situation
	Rio Branco	Tião Bocalom (PP)	Yes	Reelected 1st round
	Macapá	Antônio Furlan (MDB)	No	Reelected 1st round
	Boa Vista	Arthur Henrique (MDB)	Yes	Reelected 1st round
	Belém	Igor Normando (MDB)	Yes	Elected 2nd round
	Porto Velho	Léo Barreto (Podemos)	No	Elected 2nd round
	Palmas	Siqueira Campos (Podemos)	No	Elected 2nd round
South	Porto Alegre	Sebastião Melo (MDB)	Yes	Reelected 1st round
	Florianópolis	Topázio Neto (PSD)	Yes	Reelected 1st round
	Curitiba	Eduardo Pimentel (PSD)	Yes	Elected 2nd round
Northeast	Maceió	João Henrique Caldas - JHC (PL)	Yes	Reelected 1st round
	Salvador	Bruno Reis (União Brasil)	Yes	Reelected 1st round
	São Luís	Eduardo Braide (PSD)	No	Reelected 1st round
	João Pessoa	Cícero Lucena (PP)	Yes	Reelected 2nd round
	Recife	Eduardo Campos (PSB)	Yes	Reelected 1st round
	Teresina	Silvio Mendes (União Brasil)	No	Elected 1st round
	Fortaleza	Evandro Leitão (PT)	Yes	Elected 2nd round
	Aracaju	Emília Corrêa (PL)	No	Elected 2nd round
Natal	Paulinho Freire (União Brasil)	Yes	Elected 2nd round	
Midwest	Goiânia	Sandro Mabel (União Brasil)	Yes	Elected 2nd round
	Campo Grande	Roseane Lopes (PP)	No	Reelected 2nd round
	Cuiabá	Abílio Brunini (PL)	No	Elected 2nd round

Source: Prepared by the authors (2024).

As on the national scene, center and center-right parties dominated elections in the capitals. Only two (Recife, with the PSB, and Fortaleza, with the PT) elected candidates from the progressive camp. But avoiding the general rule, in some capitals the longer propaganda time did not mean victories at the polls.

Outliers

Manaus re-elected the mayor Davi Almeida, do Avante (TSE, 2024c). In the capital of Amazonas, the two candidates with more propaganda time, Roberto Cidade (União

Brasil) and Marcelo Ramos (PT), did not even advance to the second round, disputed between Davi Almeida, fourth fastest time, and Alberto Neto, from PL, third longest free propaganda time.

In Palmas, Janad Vacari of the PL had 5 minutes and 54 seconds in electoral propaganda through a coalition composed of 10 parties. Eduardo Siqueira Campos, from Podemos, competing alone, had 35 seconds of propaganda on TV (TSE, 2024c). He won the election in the second round, with 53.03% of valid votes.

In Teresina, the former mayor Silvio Mendes (União Brasil) had the second longest TV and radio time, about 1 minute less than the candidate with the longest time, Fábio Novo (PT), this one with 4 min 15 seconds of propaganda. Silvio Mendes won in the first round, with 52.19% of valid votes (TSE, 2024c).

Similar situation occurred in Rio de Janeiro, with the re-election of mayor Eduardo Paes, from PSD, who won in the first round with 60.47% of valid votes, against 30.81% of the second placed, Eduardo Ramagem, from PL. (TSE, 2024c). Both held the two largest electoral propaganda times, with a 2-second advantage to Ramagem.

In Belo Horizonte, the mayor Fuad Noman (PSD) was re-elected, but in the second round, with 53.73% of valid votes (670,574), while Bruno Engler, from the Liberal Party (PL), received 577,537 votes (46.27%), according to the TSE (2024c). The candidates had the two longest propaganda times: 2 min 43 sec for Engler and 2 min 34 sec for the then mayor of the capital of Minas Gerais. In the first round, the candidates had a reverse position, with Engler in first place (34.38%) and Fuad in second, with 26.54%.

In the capital of Mato Grosso, he won the candidate with third longest TV time: Abílio Brunini, from the PL, with election decided in the second round. In Cuiabá, in the first round, the times were distributed as follows: Eduardo Botelho, from União Brasil, with 3 min 50 sec; then Lúdio Cabral (PT), with 2 min 45 sec; Abílio Brunini (PL) with 2 min 03 sec and Domingos Kennedy (MDB), who had 1 min 19 sec.

Similar situation occurred in Mato Grosso do Sul, where mayor Roseane Lopes of the PP was re-elected, with the fourth longest time of TV and radio. Beto Pereira, from PSDB, despite the longer advertising time, with 4 min 58 sec, was in third place in the first round. The second placed was Rose Modesto, from União Brasil, the third longest time. Camila Jara, from PT, with the second longest time, was in third. Unlike Cuiabá, where TV times were very close, in Campo Grande, the candidate Beto Pereira had more than the sum of the others.

In São Luís, Maranhão, the election was decided in the first round. Eduardo Braide, from the Social Democratic Party (PSD), who had the second longest propaganda time,

with 2 min 30 sec, obtained 70.12% of valid votes. Duarte Júnior, of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), longest electoral time, 6 min 11 sec, was second with 22.56% of valid votes (TSE, 2024c).

Aracaju, capital of Sergipe, was another case in which the candidate with the longest propaganda time was defeated. In the capital of Sergipe, was elected Emilia Corrêa, from PL, first placed in the polls in the first and second round. The advertising times on TV and radio in Aracaju were defined as follows, in descending order: Luiz Roberto (PDT), 3 min 6 sec; Emília Corrêa (PL), 2 min 13 sec; Yandra Moura (União Brasil), 1 min 44 sec; Candisse Carvalho (PT), 1 min 35 sec; Danielle Garcia (MDB), 58 sec; Niully Campos (PSOL), with 24 sec.

Final Considerations

The data point to the strength of the TV vehicle, but some cases challenge this theory, such as those in São Paulo and Curitiba, where the candidates – without time in electoral propaganda – were about to compete or competed in the second round against opponents with greater radio and TV time. The numbers related to re-election show that not only propaganda time, stemming from the ability of parties to articulate with other organizations, but also the dominance over the public machine influences electoral success. Judging by the profile of the candidates from São Paulo and Curitiba, it is possible to conduct an exercise of reflection among the types of internet users (Aldé, 2011) that most fit into the definition of the intuitive voter of Silveira (1994). Perhaps the frustrated internet users, in his thesis more easily influenced by structures that promise to escape from traditional political discourse, betting on outsiders, characters who present themselves aligned and conservative political structures, but at the same time present themselves as challenges to the political system. But also the trenders, or consumers of scandals, insofar as such candidacies sought to guide political news with actions and impact statements.

The results of most capitals in the five regions of Brazil reveal a traditional pattern whose propaganda on radio and television (the traditional media) guide the process to some predictable extent, starting from the time of exposure.

The news are the points outside the curve identified by the research, and the use of the internet through platform (Poell, Nieberg and Van Dijck, 2020) of digital social networks ends up subverting the logic of official electoral propaganda, electing candidates with power of engagement on the internet and little (or no) time in traditional media. In this new scenario, it is possible to reflect on the proposal of Bittencourt (2016)

about the Digital Prince, that is, the internet has become a place of speech that needs to be investigated in new research. Even more so because of the existence of a new voting profile in Brazil (Silveira, 1994, 1998), influenced in our view by the modes of use (Aldé, 2011) of these platforms. The electoral process in Brazil is a space in which these transformations need to be identified and monitored at each election.

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RESUMO

Este artigo busca responder de que forma a propaganda eleitoral gratuita na TV teve influência sobre o resultado das eleições municipais no Brasil, tendo como recorte as estatísticas do pleito em 26 capitais. Utilizamos método descritivo, caracterizando-se a pesquisa como um estudo de caso (Yin, 2005). Como referência, utilizamos os tempos de propaganda gratuita no primeiro turno, na medida em que, no segundo turno, os tempos são distribuídos igualmente entre os dois candidatos. O referencial teórico tem base no conceito de Príncipe Digital (Bittencourt, 2016) e plataformização (Poell; Nieberg; Van Dijck, 2020) tendo como principal suporte o alcance dos meios de comunicação no Brasil, particularmente a televisão e, ainda, os estudos de Silveira (1994, 1988) a respeito do voto no Brasil e de Aldé (2011) sobre os tipos de internauta. Na síntese dos resultados, em 17 capitais os vencedores tinham, no primeiro turno, maior ou igual tempo de TV que seus adversários.

KEYWORDS: Propaganda eleitoral; Eleições municipais; Televisão; Internet; Plataformização.

RESUMEN

Este artículo busca responder cómo la publicidad electoral gratuita en televisión influyó en los resultados de las elecciones municipales en Brasil, teniendo en cuenta las estadísticas electorales de 26 capitales. Se utilizó un método descriptivo, caracterizando la investigación como un estudio de caso (Yin, 2005). Como referencia usamos los tiempos de publicidad gratuita en la primera vuelta, ya que, en la segunda vuelta, los tiempos se reparten equitativamente entre los dos candidatos. El marco teórico se basa en el concepto de Príncipe Digital (Bittencourt, 2016) y plataforma (Poell; Nieberg; Van Dijck, 2020) teniendo como principal soporte el alcance de los medios de comunicación en Brasil, particularmente la televisión. y también los estudios de Silveira (1994, 1988) sobre la votación en Brasil y de Aldé (2011) sobre los tipos de usuarios de Internet. Según el resumen de los resultados, en 17 capitales los ganadores tuvieron, en la primera ronda, más o igual tiempo de televisión que sus oponentes.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Propaganda electoral; Elecciones municipales; Televisión; Internet; Plataformización.